Will antivirus be more significant on Linux desktop after this xz-util backdoor?

I understand that no Operating System is 100% safe. Although this backdoor is likely only affects certain Linux desktop users, particularly those running unstable Debian or testing builds of Fedora (like versions 40 or 41), **Could this be a sign that antivirus software should be more widely used on Linux desktops? ** ( I know this time is a zero-day attack)

What if, malicious code like this isn’t discovered until after it’s released to the public? For example, imagine it was included in the initial release of Fedora 40 in April. What if other malware is already widespread and affects more than just SSH, unlike this specific case?

My point is,

  • Many people believe that Linux desktops don’t require antivirus software.
  • Antivirus can at least stop malware once it’s discovered.
  • Open-source software is protected by many parties, but a backdoor like this one, which reportedly took 2 years to plan and execute, raises my concern about being more cautious when choosing project code maintainers.
  • Linux desktops will likely be targeted by more attacks as they become more popular.

IMO, antivirus does not save stupid people(who blindly disable antivirus // grant root permission) but it does save some lazy people.

OS rely heavily on users practicing caution and up-to-date(both knowledge and the system). While many users don’t follow tech news, they could unknowingly be running (this/any) malware without ever knowing. They might also neglect system updates, despite recommendations from distro maintainers.

This is where antivirus software can be useful. In such cases, users might be somewhat protected once the backdoor signature is added to the antivirus database.

Thankfully, the Linux community and Andres Freund responded quickly to this incident.

melmi,
@melmi@lemmy.blahaj.zone avatar

Unless they’re running LFS, I don’t see the point. By the time the antivirus database is updated, surely an update will be available in the package repo?

The Linux ecosystem is built around package repos rather than manually installed software, so antivirus makes even less sense on Linux than it does on Windows. If there’s malware it’ll get removed from the repo as soon as it’s detected.

RvTV95XBeo,

I generally agree, but I will point out there are more ways to get packages than a repo - sure most things come from there, but plenty of things are provided as standalone installers (e.g., .deb packages). Having something that can scan that random .deb you need to do that one thing could be nice.

Not saying AV is the fix, but if Linux is ever going to become even slightly mainstream, you need some way to keep the “normies” from hurting themselves

Pacmanlives,

No, av would not stop this kind of attack….

ClamAV is used widely though on inbound SFTP shares though in a corporate environment

shirro,

Anti-viruses are a scam and always have been. They aren’t much more than security theater and box ticking. Don’t get into the mindset that you can outsourse security to a single product. Security is something that happens in depth. The more intrusive av software can itself become an attack vector as it often runs with lots of privileges.

Distros operate with webs of trust and cryptographically signed packages. Your distro installer verifies the integrity of the package. There is no need to check a third party signature database. It adds no value. Even well audited software could contain hidden vulnerabilities so increasingly we are running software with less capabilities via systemd, flatpak/brwrap or in containers. The environment is very different to the origins of av software on Window 9x where people would download random unsigned executables to a system with no privilege restrictions.

There are lots of challenge for the FOSS community. We love features and freedoms and those features and freedoms sometimes make security more complicated. We need to show more restraint packaging software like ssh and not add so many patches and additional dependencies. We also need to show more restraint in the typical rust, go or javascript project where adding dependencies is so easy we end up sometimes including hundreds of them for stupid crap like coloured messages or being able to handle a dozen config file formats. I don’t care about your garbage collection or advanced compile time checks, if you include hundreds of crates from other developers you are no better than npm and I would put more faith in a 20 year old c library.

BreakDecks,

Antivirus software is really useful if you’re running a lot of workstations and/or severs and you can’t trust the users. It is just another layer of security.

For a single Linux user, there’s really no need for one.

BaalInvoker,

And more, it’s known that av can increase sloppy behavior regarding security in people that does not know about security, making them feel safe and, therefore, clicking anywhere and installing anything

Av does increase the risk of being infected for most people

The way this xz backdoor was treated is good enough!

  1. Identify
  2. Announce
  3. Evaluate
  4. Rollback

Always with good version control and cryptographic keys to sign the packages

InternetCitizen2,

These are good questions. I hope as a community we can challenge if our assumptions around security are still true without being dogmatic.

possiblylinux127,

I’m not sure why you are getting down voted.

SheeEttin,

It doesn’t actually contribute to the discussion.

j4k3,
@j4k3@lemmy.world avatar

deleted_by_author

    •
    Ramen_LadyHKG,

    Real exploiters go bug hunting for zero days. The XZ thing was a humorous clown dancing a jig in a minefield. The clown spent 5 years on the sideline, then stepped on a mine immediately upon entry.

    I like your last statement.

    I agree that users should take responsibility for their system, I myself learned to fully encrypt my Linux with luks2 and things about secure boot, tpm2 or so.

    That’s why I’m making assumption of the need for non-tech savvy users, like most Windows users if they come to Linux world.

    rotopenguin, (edited )
    @rotopenguin@infosec.pub avatar

    The xz attack was not a clown show. It’s a well orchestrated attack, with a lot of clever techniques to slip a payload into something that is supposed to be fully open and readable source code. Somebody recognized a difference between what people think ssh&systemd’s dependency graph looks like, and what it actually was. Fuckery went into disabling some technical defenses (a single dot was snuck into an autoconf file! Try to find it.) and SE went into disabling others. The best malware reversers in the world have been shooting caffeine into their eyeballs for 2 days, trying to make sense of latter-stage payloads.

    This attack was damn good. They either got unlucky, or there is a small possibility that our spies out-spied them and dropped the dime. Another angle is that they were running out of time - systemd developers were getting nervous about their own surface area and were working to cut that back. The attacker took the chance on running their play before it was fully bulletproofed, because it was in greater danger of becoming an obsolete exploit.

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